

## MURPHY HAPPY OVER FIRST REAL VICTORY IN YEARS

Long Fast Broken, Braves  
Are Too Joyful to Make  
Demonstration.

## TAMMANY HALL CROWDED EARLY

At. Smith, New Sheriff, Is Centre  
of Faithful to Offer  
Congratulations.

With the first real victory since 1903, dyed-in-the-wool Tammanyites set in the Fourteenth Street wigwam last night too happy to make any demonstration as the returns showing the capture of the District Attorney's office, the Sheriff's office, the Board of Aldermen and the election of most of the city's Assemblymen were read to them by Tom Smith, the secretary of the organization.

The result, according to Charles F. Murphy, showed that the people cannot always be deceived by "raising the time worn Tammany bugaboo as an issue," and that the people, now doing their own thinking, refuse to be led by "questionable campaign methods to intimidate the voters."

"At" Smith, the new Sheriff, said that it was sometime since he and his Tammany friends had received such joyful tidings as these of last night, and that he was gratified at the tribute of confidence paid to him by the voters.

Tammany Hall was taxed to capacity by 7 o'clock. By 9 o'clock the returns showed so plainly that Tammany's long office holding fast had been broken, the crowd began to dwindle.

Downstairs in the committee room



Cost of doing business regulates your clothes cost—  
Monroe Clothes are made and sold at a minimum of expense—  
That's why you save \$10 when buying Guaranteed \$25 Monroe Clothes at \$15—and we guarantee it.

**Monroe Clothes**  
42d St. & Broadway  
2d Floor—Fulton St. & Broadway  
10 Court St., Brooklyn.  
TAKE ELEVATOR AND SAVE \$10.

## OPENING MUSIC RIDE OF THE 1915-16 SEASON

Will Be Held at

**DURLAND'S  
RIDING ACADEMY**  
TO-NIGHT  
at 8 o'clock

**COTILLON RIDE**

Commanded by Mr. Chas. T. Krauss.

Followed by

A Large and Attractive Programme.

ALL ARE CORDIALLY INVITED.

WM. DURLAND, President.

A. C. MAC BAIN, Sec'y and Treas.

Sixty-Sixth St. at Central Park  
West, New York.

When you buy your Victrola you want more than the instrument and the records. You want your Victrola plus Service.

The Knabe Victor Department has based its success on Perfect Service.

The large and handsomely appointed Victor booths, on the main floor, make the selection of Records and Victrolas a pleasure.

You have every model of Victrola from \$15 to \$400 to select from—a complete and perfect list of Victor Records await your hearing.

The Knabe Convenient Payment Plan places the Victor within the reach of any one.

The fast Motor Delivery service brings your selection to your door at the moment you wish.

Attention to every detail that makes toward the satisfaction of Victor patrons has made

**VICTOR**

plus

**KNABE**

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## CARSON BREAKS POLITICAL TRUCE; ATTACKS ASQUITH

Ex-Archbishop General Says  
Great Britain Is Groping  
in Dark.

## CABINET, HE SAYS, CAN'T RUN THE WAR

Tells of His Own Inability to  
Agree with Colleagues on  
Balkan Situation.

London, Nov. 2.—Sir Edward Carson, who recently resigned from the office of Attorney General in the Cabinet, initiated this evening in the House of Commons a discussion of the speech of Premier Asquith made earlier in the session. He criticized the Government with almost as much freedom as in the days before the war, and heralded thus a partial break-up of the political truce agreed upon in August, 1914, it met a hostile reception in many quarters.

Sir Edward began by remarking that he would have risen even if the Premier had given sufficient information to the public on matters upon which they showed anxiety, for after fifteen months of war, he thought it only right that there should be free debate in the House.

The present position, he declared, was one of grave peril. There was nothing to be gained by minimizing the danger, and he could assure the House that the desire for discussion was not in any way to minimize the main objects of the war. It was a symbol of the growing determination of the House and the country to do everything that could be done to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion at the earliest possible moment.

Sir Edward declared that on all these questions the country was groping in the dark. He held the view that the country had never fought so well, or had so readily made sacrifices as when the people understood the whole situation, and when, with its back to the wall, if necessary, the nation determined at all costs to surmount its difficulties.

Tells of Cabinet's "Gyrations."

Perhaps the gravest instance and the most recent of how the Cabinet and government worked, he said, was to be found in the Balkan situation. Nothing had astonished him more than the gyrations they had gone through in relation to British policy in the Balkans. On September 28 Sir Edward Grey stated that Bulgarian mobilization had resulted in Bulgaria assuming an aggressive attitude on the side of Great Britain's enemies and that Great Britain's policy was prepared to give its friends in the Balkans all the support in its power in a manner most welcome to them.

When he learned that this was no longer the policy of the government and that there were no plans to this end he severed his connection with the Cabinet, writing to Premier Asquith to that effect on October 12.

Sir Edward said he decided to resign as he could not support the conclusion reached by the war council of the Cabinet the day before. He said that Sir Edward Grey's statement made in the House on September 28, promising the Allies' support to Serbia, and read part of his letter to the Premier: "I cannot understand how England can abandon Serbia to her fate without national dishonor."

A Policy of Despair.

"Even if we are not so bound in honor, such a course would, in my judgment, be a policy of despair and an admission of failure which could only be justified after every other alternative had been tried and abandoned. Bulgaria will be given a free hand to crush our ally."

"All hope of inducing Rumania to come to Serbia's assistance has been abandoned, and she may even find it to her interests to join our enemies, and every encouragement will be given to Greece to follow the policy of King Constantine rather than that of M. Venizelos and his majority in the Chamber. The loss to our prestige will be incalculable and a very grave menace to our Eastern empire."

"As regards Greece, I think," he continued, "vigorous efforts should be made to compel her to fulfill her treaty obligations. It was at her invitation that we sent troops to Salonica, and we shall be rendered ridiculous in the eyes of the powers if we are compelled to withdraw and are placed in a position of dishonor. I am sure that the King's party is afraid of the Central Powers. We ought to

make her afraid of us. Our naval supremacy enables us to do this, and for my part I would not hesitate to inform her that unless she was prepared to join the Allies in friendly relations, we would break off friendly relations."

Carls Policy Fails.

"But to send an army to Egypt to await action, and to say that it is possible on the report of a general sent to Gallipoli, seems the most futile and hesitating decision that could be made, and one calculated merely to lead to further dissipation of our forces."

"I do not believe that when Germany has gained access to the lines of communication to Constantinople it will be able to maintain our efforts in Gallipoli. Indeed, I doubt very much whether our troops can stay there until that event happens."

With respect to the Dardanelles operations, Sir Edward said he could not understand how at the very time of a shortage of ammunition the government took on such a military expedition, which had cost "hundreds of millions" like a military expedition.

He did not believe the government was justified in entering on that expedition, which cost 100,000 men in casualties, and suffering which baffled description, unless they had assurances from their naval and military advisers that they were likely to carry the expedition to a successful conclusion.

"Was there ever such a story of miscalculations," he exclaimed, "as those in the Dardanelles?"

The failure at Salonica and the regard as the most disastrous and vital of the war. From that day to this, under the Cabinet's system, they had never been able to make up their minds whether they ought to proceed with the operations or boldly withdraw their men and save suffering and further loss.

He expressed the hope that new plans for the campaign in the near

East had been worked out clearly and definitely, because at the time he was in the Cabinet he could find no trace of any such thing in existence. He said that unless a man who was the men conducting the war, so long as they carried it on with every possible effort to realize victory.

In conclusion, he remarked, "to avoid any misconception, may I say that I am entirely in accord with your policy that the war must be fought to an end at any sacrifice, and until we have brought it to a successful conclusion."

John E. Redmond, the Nationalist leader, declared that the attacks upon the Premier and the persistent pessimism of a portion of the press had had no weight in Ireland and that the proposal which Mr. Asquith had made with reference to the Cabinet was one which, in his opinion, would, for the time being at any rate, silence the "treacherous."

Sir Edward Grey then arose to correct what he described as a misapprehension that had arisen from Sir Edward Carson's speech, which, he said, contained some statements which he had not intended to make. He said that the operations were being carried on as freely in time of war as in time of peace.

Sir Edward Grey Explains.

"Sir Edward Carson," said the Foreign Secretary, "must have left the House of Commons, and probably would leave our Allies, under the impression that the government made a promise to send an army to Egypt to await action, and to say that it is possible on the report of a general sent to Gallipoli, seems the most futile and hesitating decision that could be made, and one calculated merely to lead to further dissipation of our forces."

Sir Edward Grey said that his statement to the House was that the Balkan states friendly to the Entente Powers "in a manner that would be most welcome to them," was founded on something of a definite promise the government had made in the Balkans to a request from Greece. This promise had been made in common with

men of military age who still hang back, I will not hesitate to recommend supplementing the voluntary system by some form of legal obligation.

Supreme War Committee.

The Premier stated that he had concluded that it was desirable to maintain the Cabinet war committee concerned with the higher direction of the war, but to limit its membership. He suggested that it should not comprise less than three members, and that it should have the power to summon persons having special knowledge or information for the purpose of consultation. The relations of the committee to the Cabinet, he thought, should be of an advisory nature, and should be informed of important decisions and consulted before any important departure in policy was taken.

The Premier stated that there also in future would be more co-ordination between the staffs of the Allied powers.

Touching upon the question of supplies of men, munitions and money, the Premier said that the financial position was serious, and that the statistics of exports and imports and of expenditure upon the war.

"We cannot go on discharging business unless both government and industry adopt more stringent economy. Our position does not compare unfavorably with that of our enemies. The standard of life in Germany has been depressed to a very low point, indeed, but we must be prepared to make far greater sacrifices than we have done. The average cost of our army in peace time is £100 per head per year. To-day it is between twice and three times as much."

Reviewing his own share in the taking of the decisions of August last year, Premier Asquith declared: "There is nothing I wish to unsay or undo. I challenge criticism. I am as confident now as fifteen months ago that we are going to carry our righteous cause to a triumphant conclusion. I am not going to shelve the burden of my shoulder, but I am satisfied I can no longer bear the burden. As long as I enjoy health and the confidence of my sovereign, the House and the country, I will not surrender the task, heavy though it be."

Premier Asquith's closing words were: "Let us endure to the end."

Object of Gallipoli Campaign.

Detailing the objects of the attack on the Dardanelles, the Premier remarked: "The view was that it would influence the Balkan situation, and would open the way for supplies for the Russians and strike a blow at the heart of the Turkish Empire."

Naval operations continued systematically for a month, and until they culminated in the attack on the Narrows, which resulted in a setback. It was then suggested that by aid of an adequate military force the attack could be driven home to success.

Mr. Sir Ian Hamilton was sent out, and reported he was in agreement with the suggestion that a joint naval and military attack was necessary. In the whole course of the campaign I have never conceived a keener disappointment than in the failure of these operations."

Mr. Asquith pointed out that if the efforts to force the Dardanelles had been successful, they would have been of immeasurable value.

"He did not succeed," he continued, "notwithstanding the magnificent exhibition and never surpassed gallantry of our troops."

The Premier then said that in the Sea of Marmara up to October 26 British submarines sank or damaged two battleships, five gunboats, one torpedo boat, eight minesweepers and 197 ships. He alluded to the services of the novel monitors, which he said were largely the creation of Lord Fisher.

200,000 Turks Held.

"The results of the August attempt," continued the Premier, "were disappointing, but it must be considered that we had not been taken. The Russians might have had a serious Turkish attack in the Caucasus, and we might have had to face attacks in Egypt, Mesopotamia and our force on the Gallipoli Peninsula was holding up 200,000 Turks."

"The situation in the Dardanelles is receiving the most anxious consideration of the government, not as an isolated thing, but as a part of the larger strategic question raised by reason of developments in the Balkans. There is a complete agreement between us and France, both as to the end and the means in the Balkan campaign."

The Premier travelled over old ground in rehearsing the unsuccessful efforts to promote a Balkan community of interest, putting the very step had been taken in consultation with three and, latterly, four governments.

"Unlike the German government," he said, "we cannot barter away the property of our Allies behind their backs. When the Allies are reproached for not acting with sufficient speed as regards Serbia, it must be remembered that up to the last moment there was the strongest reason to believe that Greece would act up to her treaty obligations with Serbia."

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"We in the United Kingdom, France and Russia could not allow Serbia to become the victim of this sinister, nefarious combination. The general staffs of France and Great Britain have been in the closest consultation, a consultation which has culminated in the decision to visit the illustrious commander in chief. The result, I am glad to say, is a complete agreement between us as to the end and the means, but I can disclose nothing more. Serbia is the key to the Balkans, and the Balkans are the key to the East. My objection is that the employment of compulsion would endanger the maintenance of national unity. If you apply compulsion without general assent you defeat your purpose."

Referring to Lord Derby's recruiting scheme, the Premier promised to inform the country as soon after November 30 as it was possible to collect information, whether it was successful.

"Believe me," he continued, "it will produce a satisfactory result, but if it does not and if it is shown that in the recruitable reservoir there are numbers

of men of military age who still hang back, I will not hesitate to recommend supplementing the voluntary system by some form of legal obligation."

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